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ABSTRACT. Research stemming from self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987) has
demonstrated that individuals are typically more persuaded by messages from their
in-group than by messages from the out-group. The present research investigated the role
of issue relevance in moderating these effects. In particular, it was predicted that in-groups
would only be more persuasive when the dimension on which group membership was
defined was meaningful or relevant to the attitude issue. In two studies, participants were
presented with persuasive arguments from either an in-group source or an out-group
source, where the basis of the in-group/out-group distinction was either relevant or irrelevant
to the attitude issue. Participants’ attitudes toward the issue were then measured. The
results supported the predictions: Participants were more persuaded by in-group sources
than out-group sources when the basis for defining the group was relevant to the attitude
issue. However, when the defining characteristic of the group was irrelevant to the attitude
issue, participants were equally persuaded by in-group and out-group sources. These
results support the hypothesis that the fit between group membership and domain is an
important moderator of self-categorization effects.
Keywords: self-categorization, in-group, persuasion effect
AT SOME TIME OR ANOTHER, nearly everyone receives the request, “Tell me
about yourself”—a question to which most people are able to respond rather effort-
lessly. When asked to describe themselves, people are able to generate a combina-
tion of individual characteristics (such as personality traits, attitudes, and
preferences) and group membership information (such as their gender, nationality,
and occupation (Kuhn & McPartland, 1954). Our membership in different social
groups clearly makes up an important part of our self-concepts (Brewer, 1991;
Triandis, 1989). In some social contexts, our affiliation with a particular group may
even overshadow our sense of ourselves as unique individuals (Turner et al., 1987).
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Of course, individual and group sources of information about the self are far
from independent. In many situations, an individual’s personal characteristics
influence the groups to which they choose to belong—for example, when a
nurturing individual becomes a nurse. There are also times when an individual
may decide their position on a particular personality trait dimension or attitude
issue by referring to an important in-group—for example, when a feminist looks
to the National Organization of Women for guidance on how to vote in an
upcoming election.
One domain in which group membership has well-established implications
is persuasion. Research by Mackie and her colleagues (e.g., Mackie, Gastardo-
Conaco, & Skelly, 1992; Mackie, Worth, & Asuncion, 1990) has shown that
people are more persuaded by in-group than out-group sources. This “in-group
persuasion effect” is apparently due to people’s use of source information not
only as a heuristic cue to accept the in-group’s position but also as a cue to
systematically process the in-group’s arguments. For example, Mackie et al.
(1990) reported two studies in which in-groups were found to be more persuasive
than out-groups (e.g., participants were more persuaded by a student at their own
university than by a student at another university when it came to abolishing the
SAT as a college admissions criterion).
What Processes Underlie the In-Group Persuasion Effect?
Self-categorization theory (SCT) provides one analysis of the conditions in
which people think about themselves in terms of personal versus group characteristics
(Turner et al., 1987). SCT is a general theory of interpersonal and intergroup
behavior that conceives of the self-concept as fluctuating between personal and
social identities. When their personal identity is salient, people conceive of them-
selves as distinct individuals and focus on individual characteristics. In contrast,
when a social identity is salient, people conceive of themselves as interchangeable
with other members of the social in-group, and their focus shifts to in-group
characteristics.
In support of this view, Smith and Henry (1996; see also Smith, Coats, &
Walling, 1999) suggest that information about our in-groups can become part of
our self-concepts. Participants in their study were faster to make judgments about
whether or not a particular personality trait described them if the trait also
described their in-group than if it did not also describe their in-group. Smith and
Henry argued that characteristics of the in-group are actually stored as part of
one’s representation of the self. These findings suggest that the nature of an
in-group’s influence is not simply superficial in nature, but rather characteristics
of the in-group can become incorporated into the self-concept.
According to SCT, the perception that one is interchangeable with other
group members occurs through a process of depersonalization. Depersonalization,
by its very definition, involves the perception of similarity between oneself and
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the in-group. Such perceived similarity may contribute to in-group persuasion
effects in one of two ways. First, people may adopt in-group positions as their
own in a heuristic fashion, based on the assumption that they will agree with
similar others (Allen & Wilder, 1977, 1978, 1979). Second, messages coming
from in-group sources may be seen as particularly credible or informative, leading
people to systematically process such messages (e.g., Chaiken, 1980). If the
message contains strong arguments, persuasion is likely to result (Chaiken, 1987;
Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).
Likewise, Mackie et al. (1990) argued that the in-group persuasion effect
occurs because people systematically process the in-group messages, leading to
greater acceptance of the in-group’s position when the arguments in those
messages are strong. However, in later research, Mackie et al. (1992) concluded
that perceivers are likely to systematically process in-group messages only when
the position advocated in the message is not already known. When the position is
known ahead of time, people are likely to use the in-group or out-group status of
the source as a heuristic cue. In other words, when one knows that the in-group
favors a particular position, one may accept the position without scrutinizing the
in-group’s arguments for it. In contrast, when the in-group’s position is
unknown, one is likely to systematically process the message in order to correctly
ascertain the advocated position—thereby leading to greater persuasion in
response to strong in-group messages.
Moderators of Self-Categorization
Self-categorization theory has received broad support and has been applied
in a wide variety of domains (see Hornsey, 2008). Moreover, the extent to which
people operate at the level of a social (rather than personal) identity has been
found to vary as a function of a number of important factors. For example, growing
research suggests that individuals’ focus on social group memberships is
enhanced when they experience either a personal or group-level threat. Knowles
and Gardner (2008) recently reported that participants who experienced social
rejection were more likely to identify with social groups to which they belonged.
On a larger scale, Rios Morrison and others (e.g., Rios Morrison & Ybarra, 2008;
Rios Morrison, Fast, & Ybarra, 2009; Zarate, Garcia, Garza, & Hitlan, 2004)
suggest that perceived threats towards one group also promote heightened
in-group identification.
Furthermore, research within the social identity and self-categorization traditions
has established that factors such as in-group identification (McGarty, Haslam,
Hutchison, & Turner, 1994; Terry & Hogg, 1996), salience of in-group/out-group
distinctions (Oakes, 1987), majority versus minority status (Martin, 1988), and
uncertainty (Hogg, 2000) influence the likelihood that one’s attitudes, judgments,
and behavior are driven by social (rather than personal) identities. In general, fac-
tors that increase the salience of an in-group membership (e.g., due to high levels
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of identification, minority status, or subjective uncertainty) are likely to produce
greater focus on social identities.
Meaningful Categorization and Persuasion
A further development in the work stemming from SCT—and one that may
have important implications for the in-group persuasion effect—is that the
“meaningfulness” of social categorization appears to be an important moderator
of depersonalization (Oakes, 1987; Oakes, Turner, & Haslam, 1991). That is,
depersonalization should only occur in situations where the basis for group
membership is meaningful in terms of the judgment context. For example,
categorizing oneself as a university professor might be meaningful if one is
discussing grading policies with members of a student group. However, the same
categorization would be less meaningful if one were discussing dog obedience
with the same students. Essentially, the fit between the issue and the social context
determines whether self-categorization and resulting depersonalization occur.
Simon, Hastedt, and Aufderheide (1997) have provided support for this
argument. Simon et al. found that, when category meaningfulness was high,
minority group members perceived greater similarity between themselves and the
in-group and greater homogeneity within the in-group as a whole. These are signs of
depersonalization, and they occurred only when there the basis for categorization into
in-group and out-group was relevant, or “meaningful,” for the topic at hand.
Meaningfulness may also be an important moderator in-group persuasion
effects. Specifically, the fit between the attitude issue and the basis for group
membership may vary widely. Indeed, it would be surprising to find that any one
in-group was meaningful for all possible attitude issues. In cases where the
in-group is not meaningful to an issue, this reasoning suggests that depersonalization
should not occur, and hence in-group persuasion effects should not be observed.
The Present Research
The purpose of the current studies was to test the role of categorization
meaningfulness in the in-group persuasion effect. In particular, it is hypothesized
that the in-group persuasion effect should only be observed under conditions
where the attitude issue fits, or is meaningful in, the social context. Two studies
tested this hypothesis by manipulating the fit between an attitude issue and the
basis for group membership.
STUDY 1
In the first study, the fit between attitude issue and the basis for group
membership was manipulated by varying the issue about which participants read.
Participants received a persuasive message from either their own political party
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or the opposing political party. For some participants, the message conveyed support
for or opposition to legalizing euthanasia—an issue that participants should view
as politically relevant. For other participants, the message conveyed support for or
opposition to increasing the credit requirement for a college degree from 4–5 years—
an issue which participants should not view as particularly politically relevant.
Method
Participants
Ninety-five undergraduate students participated in the study. All participants
indicated that they belonged to one of the two main political parties (39 Republicans
and 56 Democrats). Students were enrolled in an introductory psychology course
at the University of Illinois and completed the study in partial fulfillment of a
course requirement. Participants completed the study in groups of 6—10.
Design
The study involved a 2 × 2 × 2 factorial design, where message source (in-
group or out-group political party), issue relevance (relevant or irrelevant with
respect to political party membership), and message position (supporting or
opposing the issue) were all manipulated between-subjects. Issue relevance was
operationalized as legalizing euthanasia (relevant issue) versus increasing credit
requirements for an undergraduate degree (irrelevant issue).
Materials and Procedure
At the beginning of each session, participants completed a brief demo-
graphic questionnaire in which they reported their political party membership.
Participants then read one of four persuasive messages that were constructed for
use in this study. Half of the participants learned that the message had been
generated by their own political party (in-group source). The other half learned that
the message had been generated by the opposing political party (out-group source).
The messages varied in the attitude issue they addressed (legalizing euthanasia
versus increasing the credit requirements for a college degree from 4 to 5 years)
and in the position (supporting versus opposing) taken on the issue. All four
messages were rated as strong by an independent sample of 35 undergraduates
(lowest M = 5.37 on a scale from 1 [very weak] to 7 [very strong]).
After reading one of the four messages, participants completed a post-message
questionnaire. The questionnaire included measures of their attitudes toward the
issue (to what extent do you support legalizing euthanasia/increased credit
requirements?), the strength and persuasiveness of the message (how strong/how
persuasive did you find the message to be?), and the knowledgeability and
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trustworthiness of the source (how knowledgeable/how trustworthy do you think
the Democratic/Republican Party is on this issue?). Participants also rated how
certain they were of their attitude, how important the issue was to them, and the
extent to which the message they read was consistent with what they expected
from the source of the message. Participants responded to all items on −3 (not at
all) to +3 (very much) rating scales.
Results
Attitudes
Participants’ attitudes toward the issue were analyzed using a univariate
analysis of variance (ANOVA), in which message source, issue relevance, and
message position were included as between-participants factors. As expected,
there was a significant three-way interaction, F(1, 87) = 7.61, p = .007 hp2 = .08.
Follow-up tests revealed a significant interaction between message source and
message position within the relevant issue (legalized euthanasia) condition,
F(1, 48) = 26.69, p < .001, hp2 = .35. Specifically, participants were more likely
to support the position presented in the message if it came from their own political
party than if it came from the opposing party, regardless of whether the message
supported or opposed euthanasia. When the message advocated legalized euthanasia,
participants expressed more positive attitudes if it had come from their own political
party (M = 1.69, s = 1.20) than from the opposing party (M = −0.88, s = 1.96),
t(22) = 3.99, p < .001, d = 1.70). When the message opposed legalized euthanasia,
participants expressed more negative attitudes if it had come from their own party
(M = 0.00, s = 1.65) than from the other party (M = 1.75, s = 0.87), t(22) = 3.25,
p < .001, d = 1.39). There were no significant differences between in-group and
out-group source conditions when it came to the irrelevant issue (increased credit
requirements), all Fs<1 (see Appendix).
Compared to the other messages, participants expressed significantly less
certainty about their attitudes when exposed to messages in favor of increased
credit requirements, as indicated by a significant interaction between issue and
message position, F(1, 87) = 8.48, p = .01, hp2 = .09. Participants also reported
that the same message was particularly consistent with their expectations of the
message source (regardless of whether the source was their own or the opposing
political party), F(1, 86) = 4.18, p = .04, hp2 = .05. No other significant effects
emerged from analyses of attitude certainty, issue importance, or consistency
with expectations of the source (see Appendix).
Beliefs About the Message and the Source
Participants’ beliefs about the strength and persuasiveness of the message
and the knowledgeability and trustworthiness of the message’s source were also
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examined. Reliability among the four belief ratings was high (a= .79), thus they were
averaged to form a belief positivity index (see Appendix for individual ratings). A
univariate ANOVA testing the effects of message source, issue relevance, and
message position on beliefs yielded significant main effects of issue relevance,
F(1, 87) = 4.49, p = .04, hp2 = .05 and of the message source, F(1, 87) = 16.00,
p < .001, hp2 = .16. Both of these were qualified, however, by a significant inter-
action between source and issue relevance, F(1, 87) = 6.28, p = .01, hp2=.07. Inde-
pendent-samples t-tests were conducted to decompose the interaction. These
indicated that beliefs about the message and its source were more positive when
messages came from the in-group than from the out-group, but this was only true
when the issue was relevant (i.e., legalized euthanasia: Min-group = 1.21, s = .71 vs.
Mout-group = −.03, s = 1.16), t(46) = 4.61, p < .001, d = 1.36. The difference between
in-group and out-group source conditions was not significant when the issue
was irrelevant (i.e., increased credit requirements: Min-group = 1.17, s = 1.04 vs.
Mout-group = .83, s = .81), t(45) = 1.22, p=.23, d = .36.
Analyses were also carried out to assess whether beliefs mediated the effects
of message source, issue relevance, and message position on attitudes. First,
however, an ANCOVA was carried out on attitudes in which message source,
issue relevance, and message position were entered as between-participants
variables, and the beliefs index was entered as a covariate that was allowed to
interact with all other variables (and with their higher-order interactions). This
test indicated that beliefs did not interact with any other independent variable
(largest F(1, 79) = 1.52, p = .22, hp2 = .02), thus the steps outlined by Baron and
Kenny (1986) for testing mediation were followed.
Mediation analyses are best done within a multiple regression framework.
The first step in testing mediation (Baron & Kenny, 1986) is to assess whether
the independent variable (i.e., the three-way interaction between message
source, issue relevance, and message position) significantly predicts the depen-
dent variable (i.e., attitudes). A multiple regression replicated the ANOVA
result reported above, as the three-way interaction was significant, b = .43, t(94)
= 2.76. p = .01, d = .57. The second step is to determine whether the independent
variable influences the mediating variable. A second multiple regression in
which the beliefs index was regressed on the independent variables revealed a
non- significant three-way interaction, b = −.01, t(94) = .06, p = .95, d = .01. The
third step is to assess whether the mediator influences the dependent variable,
which was tested by regressing attitudes onto the beliefs index. This test was not
significant, b = −.07, t(94) = .35. p = .73, d = .07. The final step is to determine
whether the effect of the predictor variable on the outcome variable is signifi-
cantly diminished when the mediator is controlled for. This was accomplished
with a multiple regression that replicated that reported in step 1, but with the
beliefs index added as a predictor. This test produced an identical three-way
interaction effect on attitudes, b = .43, t(94) = 2.76. p = .01, d = .57, indicating
that beliefs did not account for any additional variance in attitudes. A Sobel test
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provided further evidence that beliefs did not mediate effects on attitudes, Sobel
statistic = .06, p = .95.
Discussion
Participants were more influenced by persuasive messages that originated
from an in-group than from an out-group, as would be expected based on past
research on the in-group persuasion effect. However, this pattern was moderated
by the fit between the issue and the basis for in-group membership. When the
basis for belonging to a group (i.e., participants’ political party) was meaningful
for the issue at hand (i.e., euthanasia), an in-group persuasion effect emerged.
However, when the basis for group membership was less meaningful for the
issue (i.e., college credit requirements), participants were no more persuaded by
messages from their in-group than by those from their out-group. Thus, as
predicted, the meaningfulness of categorization is a crucial determinant of the
in-group persuasion effect.
Post-Test: Meaningfulness Versus Initial Attitude Strength
One alternative interpretation of Study 1’s results is that participants simply
had stronger a priori attitudes about the irrelevant issue. That is, increasing the
credit requirement for college students may be more personally relevant to partic-
ipants and might therefore elicit stronger attitudes in the absence of any persuasive
communication. As such, those attitudes might be more difficult to change (but
see Carmines & Stimson, 1980 for a discussion of the stability of attitudes
towards issues like euthanasia). To further investigate this, an independent
sample of 50 participants (from the same participant pool as Study 1) rated their
agreement with a number of attitude statements, including those concerning
euthanasia and increased credit requirements. These participants reported rather
moderate (non-extreme) attitudes towards both issues (M’s = 1.4 and 1.8, respec-
tively, on a −3 to +3 scale), and their attitudes towards the two issues were not
significantly different, t(49) = 1.26, p = .21, d = .39. While not conclusive, these
findings suggest that initial attitude strength is unlikely to account for the results
of Study 1.
Meaningfulness Versus the Group’s Expertise
A second issue that potentially limits the ability to draw conclusions from
Study 1 is that different types of groups might be seen as having more expertise
when it comes to some issues than others, irrespective of how relevant those
issues are to group membership. It could be argued that representatives of a political
party are more knowledgeable about “hot” social issues such as euthanasia than
they are about more mundane issues like increasing credit requirements.
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Although no independent evidence was collected to address this issue, this
study’s finding that participants’ perceptions of the message source’s knowledge-
ability and trustworthiness did not mediate their attitudes towards either issue
seems to argue against this interpretation.
STUDY 2
Although the results of Study 1 supported the hypothesis that meaningfulness
(as defined as issue relevance) moderates the in-group persuasion effect, the
design of that study confounded meaningfulness with the attitude issue. This
creates a problem with interpreting the results, as it is possible that participants’
attitudes about the relevant issue (euthanasia) were simply more changeable than
the irrelevant issue (increased credit requirements). As noted above, this might be
the case if, for example, increasing college credit requirements was perceived as
more personally relevant to participants. If attitudes towards that issue were less
open to change, then differences in the effects of in-group versus out-group
messages cannot be clearly attributed to meaningfulness. In Study 2, meaningfulness
was manipulated by varying the basis for group membership while keeping the
attitude issue constant.
In addition, the measures collected in Study 1 did not allow an assessment of
the processes underlying effects on attitudes. As described earlier, the in-group
persuasion effect is believed to be the result of both heuristic acceptance of the
in-group’s position and systematic processing of the in-group’s arguments. In
Study 2, a cognitive response measure was included in order to gain some insight
into the extent to which differences in attitudes may be attributed to differences
in how the messages were processed. To the extent that attitudes reflect the
outcome of systematic processing of the message, they should be mediated by the
positivity of participants’ cognitive responses (Petty, Ostrom, & Brock, 1981).
Method
Participants
Two hundred and twenty-one undergraduate students took part in this study.
All participants were enrolled in an introductory psychology course at the
University of California Santa Barbara and received partial credit towards a
course requirement in exchange for their participation.
Design
This study entailed a 2 × 2 × 2 factorial design, in which message source (in-
group or out-group political party), group relevance (relevant or irrelevant to atti-
tude issue), and message position (supporting or opposing offshore oil drilling)
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were manipulated between-participants. Unlike Study 1, which held the in-group/
out-group dimension constant and varied the relevance of the issue to that dimension,
Study 2 held the issue (offshore oil drilling) constant and varied the relevance of
the group to the issue. Thus, group relevance was operationalized as political
party (relevant to the issue of offshore oil drilling) versus university affiliation
(irrelevant to the issue of offshore oil-drilling). Political parties and universities
were chosen as the relevant and irrelevant groups (respectively) on the basis of
pilot testing, which indicated that most students expected different political
parties (but not different universities) to differ in their positions on environmental
issues. The dependent measures included attitudes towards offshore oil drilling
as well as cognitive responses to the persuasive message.
Materials and Procedure
At the beginning of the session, participants completed a demographic
questionnaire in which they reported both their university affiliation and their
political party. Next, they read one of two persuasive messages, one supporting
offshore oil drilling and the other opposing it. Both messages were rated as
strong (lowest M=5.82 on a scale from 1 (very weak) to 7 (very strong)) by an
independent sample of 35 undergraduates.
Half of the participants learned that the message had been generated by one
of two political parties (relevant group) whereas the other half learned that the
message had been generated by one of two universities (irrelevant group).
Further, half of the participants learned that the message had come from an
in-group source (their own political party or their own university), while the
other half learned that it came from an out-group source (the opposing political
party or a different university).
After reading the message, participants rated their support for offshore oil
drilling by placing a mark along a 6-inch line, where support for oil drilling
marked the left end of the scale, and opposition to oil drilling marked the right
end of the scale. Participants then completed a cognitive response measure in
which they wrote down their thoughts relating to the issue of offshore oil drilling
and message they had just read. They were given several minutes to write down
their thoughts, after which they were debriefed and excused.
Results
Prior to analyzing the data, participants were categorized according to their
political party affiliation. Participants in the relevant group (i.e., political party)
condition who indicated a party affiliation other than Democrat or Republican or
who had no political party affiliation were excluded from the analysis (N = 25).
Thus, the final analyses were conducted on data from 196 participants (121
Democrats and 75 Republicans).
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Attitudes
Participants’ responses to the attitude measure were coded by measuring the
distance (in ¼ inch increments) from the left end-point of the line on which they
marked their attitude. Thus, responses could range from 0 to 6. Responses were
then reverse-scored so that higher numbers indicated greater support for offshore
oil drilling. These responses were analyzed using a three-way analysis of
variance (ANOVA). Consistent with predictions and with the results of Study 1,
there was a significant three-way interaction between message source, group
relevance, and message position, F(1, 188) = 5.00, p = .03, hp2 = .03. Follow-up
analyses indicated that participants were more persuaded by their own political
party than by the opposing political party, regardless of the position endorsed in
the message (as reflected by a significant interaction between message source
and message position within the relevant group condition, F(1, 84) = 8.59, p = .004,
hp2 = .10). After reading a message advocating offshore oil drilling, participants
expressed more positive attitudes if it had come from their own party (M = 4.03,
s = 1.45) than from the other party (M = 3.11, s = 1.27), t(42) = 2.21, p = .03, d = .68.
In contrast, after reading a message opposed to offshore oil drilling, participants
reported more negative attitudes if the message came from their own party
(M = 1.02, s = 1.07) than from the other party (M = 1.76, s = 1.35), t(28) = 1.94,
p = .06, d = .63. This pattern did not occur in the irrelevant group (university
affiliation) condition, all Fs<1.
Cognitive Responses
Participants’ cognitive responses were coded for whether they were positive,
negative, or neutral towards the issue of offshore oil drilling. Two independent
raters coded a subset (approximately 20%) of the cognitive responses until they
reached a level of 90% agreement. Once their ratings reached that level of agreement,
the remaining cognitive responses were coded by only one rater. After coding, an
index of the positivity of cognitive responses was calculated by subtracting the
number of negative responses from the number of positive responses. Thus,
higher scores on this index reflect more positive cognitive responses.
To the extent that participants engaged in systematic processing of the
messages (rather than relying on the in-group/out-group status of the source as a
heuristic cue), the effects of message source, group relevance, and message
position on their attitudes should be mediated by the positivity of their cognitive
responses. In order to examine this issue, a four-step procedure for testing mediation
was used (Baron & Kenny, 1986). Before carrying out these steps, initial analyses
were conducted to ensure that the mediating variable (positivity of cognitive
responses) did not interact with any of the predictor variables (or with higher-order
interactions among them). This was accomplished by an Analysis of Covariance
(ANCOVA) in which cognitive response positivity was entered as a covariate
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that was allowed to interact with the other variables. This analysis yielded no
significant interactions involving cognitive response positivity, the largest F(1, 188)
= 2.30, p = .13 hp2 = .01.
The first step in testing mediation is to determine that the predictor variable
influences the outcome variable. As reported above, the predictor variable (in this
case, the three-way interaction between message source, group relevance, and
message position) had a significant effect on the outcome variable (participants’
attitudes towards oil drilling). A multiple regression that paralleled the ANOVA
reported above produced a significant three-way interaction b = .37, t(195) = 2.24,
p = .03, d = .32. The second step is to establish that the predictor variable
influences the mediating variable. A second multiple regression in which the
cognitive response index was regressed on the independent variables and their
interactions produced a marginally significant interaction, b = .36, t(195) = 1.86,
p = .07, d = .27. The third step is to establish that the mediator influences the
outcome variable and was tested by regressing attitudes on the cognitive response
index, which was significant, b = .55, t(195) = 9.07, p < .001, d = 1.30. The final
step is to establish that the effect of the predictor variable on the outcome
variable is significantly diminished when the mediator is controlled for. This step
was accomplished with a multiple regression that replicated that reported in step 1,
but adding the cognitive response index as a predictor, b = .23, t(195) = 1.56, p = .12,
d = .22. A Sobel test provided further support for a mediating effect of cognitive
responses, Sobel statistic = 2.10, p = .04.
Discussion
The results of Study 2 corroborate those of the first study, in that the fit
between the basis for in-group/out-group differentiation and the attitude issue in
question determined the extent to which participants were more persuaded by
in-group than out-group sources. By varying the in-group/out-group distinction
constant while holding the issue constant, Study 2 provided converging evidence
that the match between group and issue, rather than differences among particular
issues, produces variation in the strength of in-group persuasion effect.
In addition to providing a conceptual replication of the results obtained in
Study 1, this study also investigated the role of cognitive responses in generating
persuasion. More positive attitudes tended to correspond to more positive cognitive
responses about the issue, suggesting that they were based on systematic processing
of the message rather than reliance on cues such as the group membership of the
message source. This finding is consistent with the proposal by Mackie et al.
(1992) that in-group sources prompt systematic processing which, in the present
study, where only strong arguments were used, led to greater acceptance of the
in-group position. More importantly, however, this was more likely to be true
when the group membership was relevant to the issue in question (e.g., when
receiving a message about offshore oil drilling from one’s own political party).
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Post-Test: Meaningfulness Versus the Group’s Centrality to the Self-Concept
The results of Study 2 might also be explained in terms of the group’s centrality
to participants’ self-concepts. That is, one’s political party is a more specific iden-
tity, and might therefore be expected to be more central to self-concept than one’s
university affiliation. In order to explore this possibility, an independent sample of
40 participants (from the same participant pool as in Study 2) were asked to rate the
importance of a number of group memberships, including their political party and
their university affiliation. Participants’ ratings indicated that their political party
and university memberships were equally important to them, t(39) = 1.03, p = .31,
d = .33. Therefore, differences in the centrality of various group memberships to
participants’ self-concepts are unlikely to account for the results of Study 2.
Post-Test: Meaningfulness Versus the Group’s Credibility
A further complication in interpreting the results of both studies is the possible
confounding of meaningfulness with the group’s credibility or trustworthiness on
the issue. That is, perhaps political parties are viewed as more credible than
university groups when it comes to certain issues. Two pieces of evidence argue
against this as an alternative account for the results reported here. First, as noted
earlier, participants’ ratings of the message source’s knowledgeability and trust-
worthiness did not mediate their attitudes in Study 1. Second, the sample of 40
participants who completed the post-test above also rated a variety of group types
(including university students and political parties) on their level of credibility
when it came to various issues (including offshore oil-drilling, the issue used in
Study 2). These ratings suggested that both groups were perceived as equally credible
when it came to attitudes towards offshore oil-drilling, t(39) = 1.21, p = .23, d = .39.
General Discussion
The two studies reported here highlight an important boundary condition on
the in-group persuasion effect (Mackie et al., 1990, 1992). In-group attitudes are
particularly influential only when membership in the group is meaningful to the
attitude issue. In both studies, participants expressed attitudes that were consistent
with those advocated by their in-groups, but not their out-groups. What is important,
however, is that this was only true when there was a fit between the group and the
issue being addressed. Thus, category meaningfulness appears to be an important
moderator of the in-group persuasion effect.
Evaluating the Depersonalization Account
The results of the two studies reported here were largely consistent with
the hypothesis, derived from Self-Categorization Theory (SCT), that when a
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self-categorization is meaningful, depersonalization is particularly likely to
occur. The in-group persuasion effect is one possible consequence of depersonal-
ization. To the extent that individuals perceive themselves as interchangeable
with other members of their in-group, persuasive messages from those members
should be particularly compelling. Consistent with Oakes (1987; see also Simon
et al., 1997), evidence of depersonalization (in the form of an in-group persuasion
effect) was only observed when there was a good fit between the attitude issue
and the basis for in-group/out-group differentiation.
There are, of course, other interpretations for the data reported here, some of
which cannot be conclusively ruled out. First, one possible mediator of the effects
reported here is that participants perceive themselves to be more similar to their in-
groups on issues that match the basis for in-group membership. Earlier work (Brock,
1965; McGarry and Hendrick, 1974) found strong support for the hypothesis that
people are more persuaded by similar than dissimilar sources. And indeed, pre-test-
ing for the current studies indicated that participants expected that their attitudes
were more similar to their in-groups than their out-groups when it came to issues
that were relevant to group membership. A sample of 32 participants rated the extent
to which they expected their beliefs to be similar to those of various groups on a
number of issues. Ratings indicated that participants expected greater similarity in
their attitudes on environmental issues with their own political party than the oppos-
ing political party (t(29) = 2.54, p = .02, d = .94) This pattern did not emerge when it
came to their own university affiliation (t(29) = 1.14, p = .26, d = .42). On the other
hand, participants expected that their attitudes about academic issues to be more
similar to students at their own university than those at another university (t(29) =
2.13, p = .04, d = .79). This pattern did not emerge when it came to their political
party affiliations (t(29) = 0.87, p = .39, d = .32). It is important to note that expecta-
tions of similarity may be based on factors that are independent of salient intergroup
distinctions (e.g., past experience)—thus, it is likely that similarity-based differ-
ences in persuasion may also emerge even in the absence of self-categorization.
A second possibility is that participants were more persuaded by their
in-groups when it came to relevant issues because they were more surprised
when the in-group’s position was inconsistent with their previous attitudes. If so,
then they might have paid more attention to those counter-attitudinal messages,
which may have resulted in greater persuasion. However, there is at least one
reason to doubt this possibility. Specifically, participants’ attitudes were not
mediated by their ratings of how consistent the message they read was with their
expectations of the group. If participants were particularly surprised by messages
by which they were persuaded, then that should have been reflected in their
ratings of how consistent the messages were with what they expected. Nonethe-
less, the potential role of surprise has not yet been adequately ruled out and
should be further examined in subsequent research.
A similar point is suggested by studies by van Knippenberg and colleagues
(van Knippenberg, Lossie, & Wilke, 1994; van Knippenberg & Wilke, 1992),
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who suggest that people view arguments as stronger to the extent that they
perceive them as typical of the in-group. As a result, they are more likely to be
persuaded by such arguments. The fully factorial design employed in the present
studies makes it unlikely that perceived typicality played a role in producing the
results, as participants were equally likely to receive expectancy-consistent (i.e.,
typical) messages from either their in-group or their out-group.
Relationship to Prior Research
The results of the present research may have implications for interpreting
previous research on the in-group persuasion effect. As noted in the introduction,
Mackie et al. (1990) reported that participants were more persuaded by their own
university than by a different university when it came to issues related to college
admissions. Although the meaningfulness of this categorization was not explic-
itly measured or manipulated, both the group and the attitude issue fell within the
same (academic) domain. However, in subsequent studies, Mackie et al. did
manipulate the personal relevance of the attitude issue to the in-group versus
out-group, and found that the in-group persuasion effect was particularly strong
when the issue was especially relevant to the in-group. It should be noted that
category meaningfulness was likely lower in those studies than in the studies
reported in this paper, and yet the in-group persuasion effect still emerged.
This finding is somewhat inconsistent with the present research, which
indicated the in-group persuasion effect should only occur when category
meaningfulness is high. Thus, it is possible that multiple factors—including both
category meaningfulness and personal relevance—moderate the influence of in-
groups on individuals’ attitudes. As neither the Mackie et al. (1990) studies nor
the current studies simultaneously manipulated meaningfulness and relevance, it
is still unclear whether one or both of these factors are necessary (or sufficient) to
bring about the in-group persuasion effect.
Mackie et al. (1990, 1992) also reported that in-group messages are more likely
to be processed systematically than out-group messages. Although the current stud-
ies did not include manipulations of message quality (which is likely the best
method for ascertaining whether or not participants are engaged in systematic pro-
cessing), the cognitive response results from Study 2 did not replicate these findings.
The positivity of participants’ cognitive responses did not interact with the message
source when it came to predicting attitudes—thus, there is no evidence that partici-
pants were more likely to engage in systematic processing when reading a message
from the in-group than when reading a message from the out-group.
Political Reasoning and Persuasion
It is worth noting that the research reported here is also consistent with
contemporary theories of political reasoning that have been advanced within the
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fields of political science and political psychology. For example, Sniderman,
Brody, and Tetlock (1991) suggest that individuals make rational use of political
heuristics when making decisions in the political domain. In line with this view,
aspects of the current research suggest that politically relevant sources are deemed
more valid in determining politically relevant attitudes (see also Carmines &
Kuklinski, 1990; Ferejohn, 1990; Lupia & McCubbins, 1998). However, rather
than serving as a heuristic cue to accept the position endorsed in the message, in-
groups had their effect by influencing participants’ cognitive responses towards
the issue—suggesting that participants processed the message systematically.
The fact that participants systematically processed the message does not
preclude the possibility that the in-group status of the source also served as a
heuristic cue. The research reported here seems to suggest that individuals’ use of
political cues informed not only their final attitudes on political issues, but also
their beliefs about political messages. Participants in the present studies not only
endorsed political positions advocated by their political in-group, but also
espoused the belief that arguments generated by their political party were stronger
and more persuasive. These beliefs appeared to operate independently of persuasion
per se, as they did not significantly mediate participants’ attitudes.
Implications and Conclusions
The results reported here may have broad implications for persuasion in a num-
ber of contexts. In particular, the studies reported here focused on political attitudes,
and indeed, in-group persuasion may be particularly relevant in the political domain.
To the extent that political parties emphasize their relevance to specific issues, they
may have a greater impact on voting behavior when it comes to those issues. Indeed,
the increased influence of “Christian Coalition” in the United States since the 1990s
may exemplify this possibility. One consequence of the religious right movement
has been an expansion in the range of issues in which individuals perceive religious
affiliation to be relevant. To the extent that religious individuals come to believe that
their membership in religious groups is relevant to their political attitudes on objec-
tively irrelevant issues (e.g., gun rights or environmental issues), they are more
likely to be persuaded by the “official” position of their group.
Thus, the two studies reported here highlight the importance of considering
conditions in which the in-group persuasion effect is most likely to emerge. In
attempting to influence people’s attitudes towards an issue, it may be best to
select an in-group source, and particularly one that is meaningful when it comes
to the attitude issue at hand. Of course, the studies here are only an initial demon-
stration of one limiting condition to the general effect, and further research will
be needed to establish the generality of this limitation. Nevertheless, the
meaningfulness of categorization, as well as other potential moderators, may
prove to be a crucial factor in determining when and if the in-group persuasion
effect occurs.
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